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Abstract 
This paper concerns the implications of biased beliefs on entrepreneurial earnings. Amongst 
self-employed business owners, income is decreasing in optimism measured whilst still an 
employee. Controlling for earnings in paid employment, self-employment earnings of those 
with optimism above the mean are some 30% less than those with optimism below the mean. 
For employees, it is optimists that have higher earnings. These and associated results suggest 
that mistaken expectations lead to entry errors. As a test of external validity, future divorcees 
turn out to be financial optimists, indicating our measure captures an intrinsic psychological 
trait associated with rash decisions. 
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“What wild imaginations one forms where dear self is concerned! How sure to be mistaken!” 
Jane Austen 
“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” 
Richard P. Feynman 
 
1. Introduction 
A common theme of self-help books, exemplified by Norman Vincent Peale’s 
influential “The Power of Positive Thinking” (1952), is “When you expect the best, you 
release a magnetic force in your mind which by a law of attraction tends to bring the best to 
you.”1 There is now considerable evidence that beliefs matter for performance. Some of the 
studies are summarised in Compte and Postlewaite (2004), who argue that biased 
expectations may therefore be optimal. Nevertheless, there is a downside. Incorrect forecasts 
tend to result in mistaken decisions and hence worse outcomes. Self-belief may enhance 
performance but also result in participation in activities doomed to failure. 
This paper examines how these forces play out in start-ups, a big decision with many 
uncertainties. Optimists overweight the upside, and so tend to self-select into self-
employment, as an increasing number of studies find.2 More optimistic individuals may 
mistakenly think they have identified good opportunities and, therefore, tend to switch too 
soon and into objectively poor projects.3 These are reasons why optimism may be associated 
with lower self-employment earnings. Nevertheless, if Hamlet is right and “..thinking makes 
it so.”, optimists may outperform.  
																																								 																				
1 Peale was Donald Trump’s childhood pastor. 
2 For example, Arabsheibani et al. (2000), Cassar (2010), Puri and Robinson (2007, 2013) and Dawson et al. 
(2014). 
3 The reasoning is that of de Meza and Southey (1996), Camerer and Lovello (1999) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) for why optimistic CEOs are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. Optimism has other 
implications for entrepreneurship such as a preference for debt (de Meza and Southey (1996) tested by Landier 
and Thesmar (2009)). 
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The main finding is that prior optimism is negatively associated with the subsequent 
earnings of the self-employed. Controlling for earnings as an employee, self-employed 
pessimists earn some 30% more than optimists. In contrast, amongst employees, optimists 
earn more.4 Entrepreneurial optimism implies that as far as private returns are concerned, 
entry into entrepreneurship is sometimes mistaken. This is a reason for caution in adopting 
policies that encourage start-ups. Our results provide tentative support that optimism does 
actually matter in this regard. 
Two other papers look at how aspects of preferences affect entry into self-
employment and subsequent earnings. In Hvide and Panos (2013), the taste parameter is risk 
preference, proxied by stock market participation and personal leverage. According to 
reduced form estimates, risk tolerance encourages entry but depresses earnings. The 
interpretation is a selection effect, that more risk tolerant types accept lower expected return 
projects. Hamilton et al. (2014) study the effect of the “big five” personality traits. 
Personality potentially affects relative earning power in paid and self-employment, as well as 
relative non-pecuniary attraction. A structural model is estimated using simulated maximum 
likelihood to identify these selection and treatment effects. Self-employment is found to be 
attractive to those open to new experience but lowers its expected financial returns. 
According to the model, the sign of selection and treatment effects on earnings is the same. 
Both of these papers invoke rational expectations. In our case, the effect of forecast bias is 
investigated. Unlike the other papers, where the explanatory variables are preference based, 
systematic error implies a potential case for policy intervention to offset the bias. 
																																								 																				
4 There is evidence that the economic return to self-employment is low. According to Hamilton (2000), the 
median self-employed worker earns less than they would as an employee. Similarly, Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgenson (2002) find that the return on the equity invested in private businesses does not compensate for the 
risk involved. Levine and Rubinstein (2017) find that owners of incorporated businesses increase their gross 
earnings relative to paid employment. It is unincorporated businesses that do worse. Åstebro et al. (2013) find 
that sole proprietors suffer large income falls relative to their employee earnings. Optimism is a possible 
explanation for low earnings along with underreporting to evade tax (Astebo and Chen, 2014), preference for 
autonomy (Hurst, Li and Pugsley, 2014) and rational experimentation (Kerr et al., 2014). Åstebro et al. (2015) 
find some experimental evidence of skewness loving, possibly because large prizes are the most salient. 
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Hurst and Pugsley (2011) document that most businesses start small, remain small 
and do not innovate. This suits most owners, since the most common reason given for starting 
a business is desire for autonomy. If start-ups mostly represent “lifestyle” choices, it is argued 
that they create few positive externalities and therefore explicit and implicit subsidies should 
be eliminated. This conclusion is reinforced by overexpansion of self-employment due to 
opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance and the non-taxability of non-pecuniary benefits, 
explored in Hurst and Pugsley (2016). Although many of those setting up businesses may be 
knowingly foregoing expected income, our paper provides evidence that the fall in income is 
systematically underestimated. The implication is that if expectations were rational, there 
would be fewer start-ups.   
The next section sets out the analytical issues. Section 3 describes the data and 
discusses the implementation of the method. Results follow in Section 4. As a test of the 
robustness, Section 5 examines whether financial optimists make rash decisions in other 
spheres. Optimists are more likely to make poor marriage matches resulting in divorce and to 
be heavy smokers. Finally, brief conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Optimism and Earnings: Theory 
 
 This section provides the theoretical underpinning for the empirical finding that the 
sign of the optimism effect on earnings of the self-employed is more negative than its effect 
on employees. As optimists are also more likely to be self-employed, this cannot easily be 
reconciled with the first observation if the optimism measure merely proxies for some 
unobserved productivity attribute. The analysis is developed in two steps. First, the pure 
selection effects on intrinsic optimism are established. Then the complications arising when 
optimism is estimated as forecast error are addressed. 
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Entry into self-employment can be considered as a choice based on perceived 
comparative advantage. In the spirit of Lazear (2004), suppose earnings in both paid and self-
employment depends on unobserved entrepreneurial ability, �, and an observed attribute, �. 
An individual’s expected earnings in self-employment are �$ = � �, � 	 and in paid 
employment are �) = �(�, �).
5 It is likely that � has a smaller effect in paid employment. 
Assume that everyone starts out in paid employment, then has the opportunity to switch to 
self-employment. Also, for simplicity, that choices are made to maxmize expected earnings. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, under rational expectations, conditional on the observable taking 
value �, individuals with � above �- become self-employed. Average earnings are higher in 
self-employment as the only reason to switch from paid employment is to boost earnings.  
Optimists overestimate returns in self-employment relative to paid employment.6 
Specifically, setting up a business gives more scope for optimism than continuing as an 
employee, as proposed by de Meza and Southey (1996). Evidence that the self-employed are 
indeed more optimistic than employees is provided by, amongst others, Arabsheibani et al. 
(2001), Puri and Robinson (2007, 2013) and Åstebro et al. (2007). Dawson et al. (2014) find 
that optimism predates self-employment but is increased by self-employment. 
																																								 																				
5 This formulation assumes that returns do not depend on the numbers choosing each option. For example, if 
more restaurants are opened, this may depress returns to all, as in de Meza and Southey (1996). As this paper is 
concerned with the effect of individual differences in optimism this crowding effect can be ignored.  
6 Usage is not settled. Many economists (e.g. Hvide, 2002), including us, consider optimism to be a self-serving 
bias in an estimate whilst excessive precision in the estimate (an overly narrow confidence interval) is 
overconfidence. Overconfidence sometimes covers both meanings. For some optimism is sometimes reserved 
for bias in the estimation of own ability as opposed to of favourable external events. Bengtsson and Ekeblom 
(2014) find that in Sweden, the self-employed are more optimistic about macro-economic variables than 
employees. Psychologists typically do not regard optimism as a forecast error but an upbeat attitude or a belief 
that good things will happen (as in the LOT-R general optimism inventory). For some individuals, this is a 
rational expectation, in which case they are not optimists in the sense of making self-serving errors. Moore and 
Healy (2008) (see also Astebro, Nande and Weber, 2014) distinguish between overestimation of the individuals 
own ability or performance, overplacement where individuals assess their ability rank too highly, and 
overprecision, excessively narrow confidence intervals (overconfidence in terms of the previous footnote). 
Astebro, Jeffrey,and Adomdza (2007) find evidence that inventor-entrepreneurs exhibit greater overestimation 
than the general population over performance in general knowledge testing as well as in LOT-R style general 
optimism. 
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For now, suppose that there are just two types of expectation: rational or optimistic. 
The perceived returns of an optimist in self-employment are �$ = � + �(�, �) with � > 0.
7 
What matters is that optimism makes self-employment attractive relative to paid employment. 
For simplicity, it will be assumed that optimism does not affect perception of returns in paid 
employment at all. In Figure 1, the threshold for an optimist to enter self-employment is �2 <
�-. If the distribution of � is the same for optimists and realists, controlling for observables, 
optimists are more likely to enter self-employment than realists but earn less on average.8 
It is possible that the distribution of � is different for optimists and realists. Suppose, 
for example, the � distribution of optimists is shifted to the right relative to realists. This 
augments the tendency for optimists to enter self-employment, but tempers the tendency for 
optimists to earn less. The combination of high entry into self-employment and low earnings 
is unlikely to be generated by omitted-variable bias. 
  
																																								 																				
7 Whether the optimism boost is additive, multiplicative or some other form is immaterial for what follows. 
8 An extension to the model is that the self-employment opportunity available to an individual may be the result 
of a stochastic draw. The individual’s unobserved project quality can be included in the � function. Optimism 
now concerns project quality as well as own attributes but the implications are the same. 
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Figure 1: Selection in to self-employment 
In bringing the model to the data, the complication is that optimism is not directly observed 
but estimated from earlier earnings forecast error. This has the advantage of directly 
concerning the relevant bias, but as earnings are a component of optimism, care must be 
taken to ensure that any relationship is not purely mechanical. Optimism is therefore 
measured in periods before its effects are estimated. Even so, the effects of measurement 
error must be accounted for. Unlucky income realizations raise measured optimism, but if the 
shock is transitory, optimism will be associated with higher future earnings, or unchanged 
future earnings if the shock is permanent. Measurement error is the only way optimism 
affects the earnings of those continuing in paid employment, and, as such, its coefficient will 
tend to be positive. In self-employment, the selection effect offsets measurement error, so the 
overall optimism effect could be negative. 
 
Making these points more formally, the effect of optimism on forecast is 
��������<= = ��������	�����������<= + �< 																																														 1  
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where the forecast is for period � made at � − 1 knowing the employment mode at �. �< is 
intrinsic optimism. Realized earnings are 
��������<= = ��������	�����������<= + �<= +	�<=																						(2) 
where �<= is a transitory income shock and �<= is a permanent shock. Measured optimism, as 
distinct from intrinsic optimism, is 
																	����������������<= = ��������<= − ��������<= = �< − �<=−�<=											(3) 
For an individual remaining in paid employment, rationally expected earnings only differ in 
each period by the income shocks,9 so from (1), (2) and (3) 
��������<= = ��������	�����������<=KL + �<= + �<= + �<=KL
= ��������<=KL +����������������<=KL − �< + �<= + �<=KL
+ �<=						 4  
The earnings equation (4) is the basis for empirical estimation. Realized earnings are 
observable, as is measured optimism. Intrinsic optimism is not observable, but as it is a 
component of measured optimism with opposite sign to its direct appearance in the equation, 
its magnitude has no influence on earnings. The same is true of permanent shocks.10 
However, measured optimism is decreasing in lagged transitory shocks, which do not 
otherwise appear in (4). For employees, future earnings are therefore increasing in past, 
measured optimism. This is not due to selection effects but measurement error. There is no 
selection effect because the unobserved variables that influence earnings in � had the same 
effect at � − 1, so are effectively controlled for in the future earnings equation. This is not the 
case for the self-employment earnings equation because the unobservables play a different 
role in the two modes.  
 
																																								 																				
9 It is possible that as careers develop some characteristics play different roles. In that case the effect of 
unobserved variables may not be perfectly captured by first-period earnings. 
10 As in Gervais and O'Dean (2001), it may take time to adjust to a negative permanent shock during which time 
optimism prevails.    
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For those moving in to self-employment, 
��������<= = ��������	�����������<=KL + � �, �< + �<= + �<= + �<=KL
= ��������<=KL +����������������<=KL − �< + �(�< , �, �<)+�<= + �<=
+ �<=KL															(5) 
In the first expression of (5), the rational expectation is for earnings at � − 1 when the 
individual is still in paid employment. To obtain self-employment earnings at �, an 
adjustment must be made to take into account that individuals earning the same in paid 
employment are differentially suited to self-employment. The extent to which adjustment is 
needed depends on the individual’s �. This is unobservable, but due to selection the mean 
value of � is decreasing in optimism. Hence the adjustment function, �(�, �<).  
 
The properties of (5) with respect to measured optimism depend on the reason for variation. 
If measured optimism is high due to a transitory shock at � − 1, earnings will be higher at �, 
just as in the paid employment earnings function, (4). Higher �< raises measured optimism 
but the earnings effect is no longer exactly cancelled out due to the �(�, �<) term which 
imparts a negative effect. 
The analysis has so far assumed that intrinsic optimism does not have a direct 
productivity effect. This is not necessarily the case. Incorrect expectations may mean that 
optimists take poor operating decisions, which may be particularly important for those 
running their own business. Optimism may also have positive effects. For example, as argued 
by Trivers (2000), optimism may have evolved to influence others. The best way to convince 
others of your competence is really to believe in it yourself. Self-deception begets effective 
deception. Some evidence of this role is provided by Adomdza et al. (2016) and 
Schwardmann and Van der Weele (2016). For employees, the target of influence is most 
obviously the boss, but could include customers or suppliers. The latter two influences are 
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also potentially relevant for the self-employed, as is the ability to persuade financiers. Effort 
choice may also be affected by optimism.11 In principle, the effect could run in either 
direction. Optimists may apply more effort because they overestimate its marginal 
effectiveness or decrease effort because they believe that even with low effort success is 
assured, albeit with decreasing marginal returns.12 For those remaining in paid employment, 
any productivity effects of optimism will be reflected in first period earnings. Given the 
second-period earnings function has first-period earnings as a control, it remains true that 
optimism only figures as a result of transitory shocks. As the productivity effect of optimism 
may be different in self-employment and paid employment, it may not be neutral in the self-
employment earnings function. Denote self-employment earnings of an optimist as �$ =
�(�, �, �). In Figure 1, the earnings schedule of the optimistic self-employed is now distinct 
from the realistic. This will move the propensity to enter and earnings of optimists in opposite 
directions. Whatever the outcome, optimism still leads to excess entry. 
In summary, the equilibrium relationships implied by self-selection and the optimism 
measure are as follows; 
1. The optimism coefficient in the paid employment earnings function will be positive. 
2. In the self-employment earnings function, the optimism coefficient will be lower than 
in paid employment and may be negative if selection effects are strong enough.	
3. Optimists are more likely to be self-employed.	
 
3. Data source and methods 
																																								 																				
11 In the empirical work it is possible to control for variation in hours. 
12 Moscarini and Fang (2005) show that if optimism is good for incentives, employers may be better off 
preserving illusions by not tailoring offers to individual productivity. That is, optimism may lead to wage 
compression.  
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In outline, the method is to use the initial years of a large and long panel dataset, 
which includes forecasts and realizations, to estimate individual optimism and earnings 
capability in paid employment. Subsequent years of data are then used to determine how 
optimism impacts earnings controlling for past earnings and realizations.  
 
3.1. The BHPS survey instrument 
The data source for the analysis is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey initiated in 1991 and funded by the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council as an internationally comparative multi-purpose 
research resource. A stratified random cluster sample of households, drawn from the 
population of British household postal addresses in Great Britain, is tracked annually.13 Each 
wave includes household and individual questionnaire instruments, the latter completed 
separately by all adult household members present at each wave. Follow-on rules ensure the 
tracking of any newly formed households involving originally enumerated household 
members. The individual instrument covers a range of topics including demographic 
characteristics, economic activity, and finances, and includes some recall items on family 
background, education and employment history. The original sample of approximately 5000 
households (comprising around 12000 individuals) was recruited in 1991. This study uses 
data from 18 annual waves available between 1991 and 2008.14  
																																								 																				
13 The far north of Scotland is excluded because of the prohibitive sampling costs. The original survey excludes 
Northern Ireland. Booster samples for Wales and Scotland recruited in 1999 and a sample for Northern Ireland 
recruited in 2001 are excluded from the analysis. 
14 Sample attrition rates in the BHPS are generally low and certainly comparable to those achieved in other 
similar household panels. As is typical with household panels the highest attrition rate of individuals was 
between Waves 1 and 2 (12%). Attrition between Waves 2 and 3 was 7% of the original individuals and 
subsequently averaged 2.4% of the original sample between waves. In common with nearly all previously 
published research using this data source, attrition is assumed to be a random event. From 2009 onwards the 
BHPS sample has been merged into a much larger new longitudinal household study with further widening of 
scope, including biosocial analysis. However, some reductions in questionnaire detail yields the larger dataset 
unsuitable for the present analysis. 
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The BHPS survey design has evolved to incorporate a number of regional boosts, 
however the sample used in the analysis is restricted to the originally enumerated sample 
across Great Britain (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland), and to those individuals who are either 
in paid employment or self-employed. Self-employed is defined here as those who self-
identify as self-employed business owners. This is checked by the interviewer against their 
UK tax status, under which those who declare themselves to be self-employed are responsible 
for own income tax declarations and payments, rather than directly through employer-made 
deductions. Freelancers and subcontractors who may be self-employed for tax purposes but 
are not business owners are excluded from the definition and the analysis, drawing on 
information in a questionnaire item about the nature of the self-employment. This leaves 
approximately 80% of the self-employed who are business owners.	 
 
3.2. Defining and measuring intrinsic optimism 
In establishing the relationship between optimism and earnings, the first step is to 
construct a measure of optimism defined as an excessive belief in the probability of good 
financial realizations. The measure of optimism is forecast error, the challenge being to 
separate systematic bias (intrinsic optimism) from random error. Positive (negative) errors 
may just reflect bad (good) luck. A further issue is that bias may depend on what it is that is 
being forecast. Optimism is greater when individuals believe events are under their control 
(e.g. Harris, 1996)15 and when the task is difficult (Lichtenstein and Fischoff, 1977).16 
Ideally, the forecasting task should be reasonably uniform across individuals and similar to 
that in the setting of study. 
The optimism measure is constructed from two questionnaire items on financial 
expectations and realizations, asked of all individuals in each year. The first is: 
																																								 																				
15 The “illusion of control” (Langer, 1975) is the excessive belief that an individual can influence events.  
16 Starting a business normally involves both characteristics. 
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“Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from now; 
better than you are now, worse than you are now, or about the same?”  
Individuals who gave a valid response at year t are then matched with their self-reported 
financial realization at year t+1, obtained from the second question:  
“Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same 
financially than you were a year ago?”  
The survey instrument asks for responses to both questions on three-point scales. So 
the empirical approach set out in section 2 must be adapted to the categorical nature of these 
forecast and realization data. To measure optimism from data of this type we follow Das and 
van Soest (1997), Arabsheibani et al. (2000), and Souleles (2004) in constructing a five-point 
measure of forecast error, defined as the difference between the financial forecast (of t+1) at 
t, minus the financial realization at t+1.17 As our optimism measure is based on financial 
forecast error, to determine the influence of optimism on earnings there must be no overlap in 
the time periods covered by these variables. For instance, in a cross-sectional approach, 
random negative shocks occurring after the forecast is made mechanically imply optimism 
and earnings are negatively correlated. To eliminate this concern, optimism is computed for 
two groups of individuals who will be referred to throughout the analysis as futures and 
nevers. Futures are those currently in paid-employment who become self-employed later in 
the panel. For this group, the optimism measure is computed over their period of paid 
employment prior to entry into self-employment. Data for the year prior to transition into 
																																								 																				
17 This procedure involves cardinalization of the forecast error. For example, forecasting better and achieving 
same is treated as equivalent to forecasting same and achieving worse. Although the five-point scale is 
commonly used, there is no fundamental defence of the procedure beyond saying it represents a convenient 
mapping from continuous but unobserved underlying forecasts and realizations. If the specification is wrong, it 
will make it harder to find optimism effects. 
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self-employment is excluded as forecasts may be associated with unusually low financial 
outcomes if the switch to self-employment was occasioned by involuntary severance from 
paid employment, and therefore not anticipated. Nevers are those who remain as employees 
over the full period covered by the dataset. For this group, optimism is computed over the 
first half of available years in paid-employment (specifically the next highest integer to the 
midpoint number of years).18		
The categorical nature of the data is a drawback, but the longitudinal feature is an 
advantage since it allows more precision in identifying intrinsic optimism. Averaged over a 
number of periods, the noise in the optimism measure will be diminished though not 
completely eliminated. To take advantage of this property, a linear fixed-effect regression is 
estimated for all those in the sample as follows: 
�<= = �<=
Q � + �� + �<=                         (6) 
where Mit is the forecast error by individual i at time t. �<=
Q  is a vector of time-varying 
demographic and other person-specific characteristics of individual i, as well as region and 
year dummy variables. For futures the observations are for the period in paid employment, 
and for nevers it is the first half of the period for which they are observed. The individual 
fixed effects in this regression, �< 	,are extracted to provide estimates of intrinsic optimism net 
of any environmental influences from location and time and any changes to individual 
circumstance. These fixed effects are used as regressors in the second-phase earnings 
equation. 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for the nevers and futures in 
their first-phase when everyone is an employee. In total, there are 31,968 observations from 
																																								 																				
18 A transition into self-employed business ownership is defined to have occurred if an individual’s full-time or 
main economic status changes to that state.	A small number of transitions into part-time self-employment 
alongside full-time or part-time paid employment are excluded from the self-employed. Only the first spells of 
paid and self-employment are included in our sample. Few individuals start in self-employment and they are 
excluded.  
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7,985 individuals. Of these, there are 3,138 futures observations from 618 individuals. For 
nevers there are 28,830 observations from 7,367 individuals.  Intrinsic optimism is therefore 
constructed from an average of 5.1 observations per individual for futures and 3.9 
observations per individual for nevers.  The average financial forecasts of futures exceed 
those of nevers, but average realizations are only marginally lower for futures. The forecast 
error is in the optimistic direction for both groups but futures are more optimistic than 
nevers.19  
The full estimate of equation (6), which provides the optimism estimates, is in 
Column 1 of Table A2. It includes a range of demographic status, education and housing 
tenure status variables that might a priori be reasonably expected to influence financial 
forecasting or realizations. Although the controls are jointly significant, few are individually 
significant. The fixed effects from this equation are our estimates of intrinsic optimism 
though it should be noted that using simple averages of forecast error yield similar second-
stage results as to whether optimism is correlated with subsequent earnings in self-
employment for futures and paid-employment for nevers.  
 
3.3 Earnings definition and measurement 
Gross monthly self-employment earnings are computed as follows. Approximately 
82% of self-employed business owners prepare annual accounts and so provide estimates of 
their share of profits (Table A4). Earnings data for the remainder are taken as the response to 
a supplementary question about pre-tax monthly self-employment earnings. The BHPS public 
release data file merges these into a single derived variable, measuring estimated monthly 
gross self-employment earnings. Annual loss data is available for the self-employed, but only 
for respondents who prepare annual accounts. For this reason, the single derived self-
																																								 																				
19 Some nevers may enter self-employment later, in which case the tendency is to under record the extent of the 
optimism difference with futures. 
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employment earnings variable sets earnings to zero for those whose annual reported profits 
are negative.20 Because this treats the earnings distribution as left censored, a Tobit estimator 
is used in the earnings specification described in the next section.	To allow for any systematic 
difference in measurement error between the two response types, the self-employed earnings 
regression includes dummy variables to control for data reporting method. For nevers, 
earnings are defined as gross monthly salary from main paid employment job. Table A4 
reports the mean and percentiles for gross monthly earnings by employment status. These 
reveal that the paid-employed have a relative advantage at the lower end of the distribution, 
but that above the 90th percentile the self-employed have a relative advantage.	This earnings 
pattern will therefore appeal to optimists. 	
 
3.4 Earnings equation specification 
The relationship between prior optimism and earnings is estimated by means of two 
earnings regressions. One is for the self-employed business owners who were previously 
futures and the other for nevers estimated over the second half of their employment period. 
Following equations (4) and (5), these take the form: 
�<= = �������� + 	��� + 	�������������< + 	�����������������< + �X�X<=X + �<=	 
(7) 
where  is gross monthly earnings and �<= observable characteristics including age and 
hours of work and �<	is the standardized fixed effect from the first-stage optimism equation.
21 
To emphasize, there is no overlap in the periods over which the first-stage variables and  
are measured. The primary interest is in the sign and significance of �. 
																																								 																				
20 Incorporating the available negative earnings data does not materially affect any of the subsequent results. 
21 Instead of (7), a fixed-effect equation for the earnings of futures can be estimated with the optimism measure 
(and other controls) interacted with a self-employment dummy. This formulation yields a negative differential 
effect of optimism which is significant at the 5% level. The effect of optimism on those remaining in paid 
employment cannot be captured by this procedure, only the differential effect. 
it
E
it
E
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One potential criticism of the method is that, by construction, the optimism measure 
will tend to be negatively correlated with contemporaneous realizations and, to the extent that 
shocks are permanent, with future realizations and income. If expectations are not rational, �< 
will act as a proxy for low underlying earning power and, therefore, be directly correlated 
with low earnings in the future. A negative association between �< and �<= in equation (7) 
may simply reflect this effect rather than the influence of optimism on business start-up. To 
eliminate this possibility, when estimating the effect of optimism on earnings, two controls 
are included. The first, ����������������<, is the fixed-effect extracted from a linear 
realizations equation estimated for the same sample and period as for the optimism fixed 
effect, �<. The estimated equation, which provide the optimism regressor, is reported in 
column 2 of Table A2 in the Appendix. This procedure eliminates the impact of the optimism 
effect on earnings simply arising due to extrapolation from past performance.22 Moreover, the 
categorical realization variable is not the only measure of past earnings power available. 
There is also the self-reported wage. In principle this ought to be a better measure of past 
individual labour market performance as it measures labour income rather than the 
individual’s perception of their overall financial situation. So a second control, 
������������<, is also used to eliminate any spurious optimism-earnings association. This is 
the individual fixed effect extracted from an hourly earnings regression estimated over the 
same period as �< and ����������������<. These fixed effects serve as a proxy measure of 
intrinsic earnings ability. Table A3 reports the earnings equation which provides this 
regressor. The estimated coefficients on key education, occupation and other labour market 
and employment characteristics conform to those in the huge body of past work on the 
determinants of earnings. 
																																								 																				
22 The greater the extent to which past realizations are due to permanent shocks, the lower might expectations 
be. Thus lower optimism implies worse performance, contrary to the self-employment finding. 
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The effect of past optimism on future earnings is thus measured and compared for 
individuals controlling for past earnings history, closing off the poor performance channel as 
the explanation of optimism effects. That this procedure succeeds in removing these 
mechanical effects is indicated by the fact that the relationship between optimism and 
earnings, as discussed in the next section, is found to be positive for nevers. This is consistent 
with recorded optimism sometimes reflecting bad luck. Individuals may make rational 
forecasts but, by chance, realizations are low, and so they appear in our data as optimists. 
Because of mean reversion these individuals should do better in the future. For futures this 
effect may still be present but now the effect of intrinsic optimism on entry more than offsets 
the rational expectations effect. 
Table A4 summarises the second-phase data used to model earnings. The self-
employed earn significantly less than employees, although from Table A1, when still in paid 
employment futures earn significantly more than nevers. The self-employed are much more 
likely to be male, reflecting the lower proportion of women amongst the self-employed in the 
UK. The self-employed are less likely to hold university/college degrees than nevers but are 
more likely to have dependent children, to be home owners and married. Just over 18% of 
self-employed respondents report leaving compulsory schooling with no formal qualifications 
compared to 16% of the employed. Home ownership and wealth has also been found to be 
correlated with self-employment activity consistent with a “collateral channel” (Black et al., 
1996; Adelino et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2015; Jensen et al., 2015, Schmalz et al., 2017 
amongst others). As noted, high levels of home ownership are reported by the self-employed, 
with approximately 69% reporting a mortgage debt on their property. Labour market 
experience is captured through the inclusion of an employment tenure variable. On average 
the self-employed have nearly 4 years of employment tenure and nevers 5.7 years. For the 
self-employed, prior experience may, however, be provided indirectly through parental role 
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models (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Colombier and Masclet, 2008) as well as genetic factors 
(Lindquist et al., 2015). Parental business ownership experience is included as a control. Over 
three-quarters did not have a self-employed parent, with 22% reporting that one or both 
parents were self-employed. The self-employed also work just over nine hours longer per 
week than nevers.  
	
4. Results 
4.1 Selection into self-employment 
The first question is whether there is selection on optimism. Evidence in favour is that 
the respective mean standardized optimism scores for futures and nevers are 0.115 and -
0.010, both measured whilst in paid employment, with the difference in means statistically 
significant at the 1% level.23 Figure 2 displays the distributions of our measure of 
standardized optimism, �<,	 for futures and nevers. It shows that futures are significantly more 
optimistic at all points on the lower three-quarters of the distribution.  
  
																																								 																				
23 The test of difference in means is bootstrapped to account for the fact that optimism (�<), is generated, rather 
than observed. 
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Figure 2: Distributions of standardized intrinsic optimism  
 
Note: There is a single optimism score per individual yielding a sample of 618 individuals for 
futures and 7367 individuals for nevers.  
 
A probit selection into self-employment equation for the combined sample of nevers 
and futures, is also estimated, using one observation per individual. This equation is reported 
in Table 1, where the dichotomous dependent variable takes on the value of one for 
individuals observed as futures and zero for individuals observed as nevers. Marginal effects 
are reported where characteristics are held constant at their respective mean values. Optimism 
is highly significant, consistent with previous research, notably Dawson et al. (2014). A one-
point increase in the optimism measure is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in 
the likelihood of future self-employment. This implies a 21% increase in the probability of 
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future self-employment when evaluated as a one-point increase in optimism from the mean 
level of optimism in the sample.24 
Table 1: Optimism and selection into self-employment  
Dependent Variable  1 if Future, 0 if Never  
Estimator Probit 
Sample Cross section 
Variable Marginal Effect 
(std. err.) 
Standardized Optimism (��) 0.013*** 
 (0.004) 
Past Earnings (������������<) 0.030*** 
 (0.004) 
Past Realizations (����������������<) 0.013** 
 (0.004) 
Year of Birth 0.00001 
(0.0004) 
Male 0.037*** 
(0.002) 
Both parents self-employed 0.068*** 
(0.006) 
Father self-employed 0.026*** 
(0.003) 
Mother self-employed 0.022** 
(0.008) 
Observations  7,609 
Mean of Dependent variable 0.076 
Note: The estimated standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped to account for the fact 
that �<, ������������< and ����������������< are generated, rather than observed. A bootstrap 
procedure is used involving 500 repetitions which draws bootstrap samples (random samples 
with replacement) and puts them through the multiple stage-procedure.  * indicates 
significance level (p-value) below 0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.  
 
 
																																								 																				
24 For robustness we also run the probit regression presented in Table 1 using all the available individual 
observations for our sample of futures and nevers. This equation includes the time invariant controls reported in 
Table 1 and a further barrage of time-varying controls. This procedure yields a marginal effect of approximately 
2 percentage points on our optimism variable. This equates with a 24% increase in the probability of future self-
employment when evaluated as a one-point increase in optimism from the mean level of optimism in the 
sample. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, where the standard errors are clustered and 
bootstrapped to account for the panel nature of the data and the generated regressors. In addition, using OLS 
also does not alter the conclusions drawn from Table 1. 
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4.2 Earnings and optimism 
Table 2 reports the key findings, namely those for the earnings model set out in 
equation (7). The first column of Table 2 reports results for the self-employed (those 
previously futures) using the Tobit estimator because of the earnings left-censoring issue 
noted earlier. In the second column the earnings model for nevers in the second half of their 
panel presence is reported. This is estimated by OLS with earnings in levels. Paid 
employment earnings functions are usually estimated in semi-log form to allow for 
distributional skewness. However, the purpose here is to provide meaningful comparison 
with the self-employed. In the third column the differential effect of optimism on self-
employment and paid-employment earnings is formally investigated. Specifically, the results 
from a Tobit estimator that pools the self-employed and employee sub-samples are reported, 
imposing the restriction of a common coefficient on each of the control variables across the 
two sub-groups.  
The effect of optimism on earnings is significantly positive for employees, negative 
for the self-employed and the difference between the groups is highly significant statistically. 
Importantly, the inclusion of the prior earnings control (the individual fixed-effect from the 
prior paid-employment earnings equation, in Table A3) means that the coefficients on time-
invariant intrinsic optimism in Table 2 measure differential effects of the variable in paid and 
self-employment, or, in the case of nevers, early versus later career effects. Specifically, if 
optimism affects earnings as an employee, this effect is captured by the inclusion of first-
stage earnings fixed effects. The self-employment optimism coefficient in Table 2 therefore 
measures how optimism as an employee boosts or limits self-employment earnings. The 
effects are not small. For nevers, a one-point increase in standardized optimism is associated 
with an increase in monthly earnings of £48 (An increase of 2.8% when evaluated at mean 
employee earnings). For futures, a one-point increase in optimism is associated with reduced 
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monthly self-employed earnings of £283 (A reduction of 20.5% when evaluated at mean self-
employed earnings). Moreover, the self-employment earnings of those with optimism below 
the mean exceed those with above average optimism by 32%, controlling for other 
characteristics.	 The results from the pooled Tobit regression are also in line with these 
conclusions. A one-point increase in the standardized optimism score lowers (increases) 
earnings by £239.37 (£37.84) for the self-employed (employees), with the difference being 
statistically significant at the 1% level.25 
Table 2: Optimism and earnings 
Dependent Variable Gross Monthly Earnings (in £’s) 
Estimator (1) Tobit (2) OLS (3) Tobit 
Sample Self-Employed Employee Pooled 
Variable 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Standardized Optimism (��) -282.50** 
(143.40) 
 
48.10** 
(22.56) 
 
-239.37*** 
(88.67) 
 
Employee 
  
743.80*** 
(80.82) 
 
Employee*Optimism 
  
277.20*** 
(89.03) 
 
Observations 1,964 25,537 27,501 
Mean of Dependent Variable £1381.5 £1733.9 £1708.8 
Note: The estimated standard errors in parenthesis are clustered and bootstrapped to account 
for the panel nature of the data and the fact that �<, 	������������< and 	����������������< are 
generated, rather than observed. A bootstrap procedure is used involving 500 repetitions 
which draws bootstrap samples from the clusters (random samples with replacement) and 
puts them through the multiple stage-procedure. * indicates significance level (p-value) 
below 0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01. The regressions also include additional 
controls for whether the respondent draws up profit and loss accounts (column 1 only), prior 
performance controls, age in quadratic form, gender, marital status and household 
composition, health, educational attainment, housing tenure, parental background in self-
employment, hours worked per week, employment tenure and whether the respondent is 
holding a second job.  The regressions all include a series of one-digit industry dummy 
variables, and a set of year and region of residence dummy variables. Columns (1) and (3) 
have 137 left censored observations at gross monthly earnings ≤ 0. From column (3) the 
																																								 																				
25 For robustness, the analysis in Table 2 is redone with the generated variables, standardized optimism, past 
earnings and past realizations (i.e. the generated regressors) replaced by the respective raw individual time-
averaged financial forecast error, log hourly real wage and financial realization over the relevant period. Results 
are similar to those reported in Table 2.  
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effect of optimism on earnings for employees is £37.84, which is statistically significant at 
approximately the 10% level. Full estimates are reported in Table A5 of the Appendix. 
 
These findings are consistent with expectations involving both rational and 
psychological elements. To the extent that the optimism measure captures temporary negative 
income shocks, it will be associated with improved subsequent performance.26 This is likely 
to be the main effect in paid employment. To the extent that measured optimism reflects 
systematic psychological bias, entry errors arise, imparting a negative relationship between 
optimism and self-employment earnings.27 The self-employment finding might also reflect 
optimists being relatively less successful at running businesses compared to experience as 
employees. As optimists potentially take their operating decisions based on false information, 
this could lead to lower earnings. If this is the case, then realists should do best. Earnings 
would then not be monotonic in optimism. Unreported results, which estimate self-
employment earnings with the inclusion of quadratic and cubic optimism effects, fail to find 
significant higher order terms in optimism. This suggests that optimism does not affect 
operating performance. 
 
As Table A5 looks at second-phase earnings controlling for first-phase earnings, time 
invariant characteristics are only significant for employees to the extent that their impact 
changes through time or first-period temporary shocks are important. In the case of the self-
employed, effects are also possible because different characteristics matter in the two 
employment modes. It is notable that relative to initial earnings, men earn more than women 
but the difference is greatest for the self-employed. Taken in conjunction with the Table 1 
result that men are more likely to be self-employed, the gender gap arguably suggests that 
																																								 																				
 26 Possibly the optimists work harder, overestimating the earnings effect 
27 Including graduate/optimism interaction does not yield significant coefficients suggesting optimism effects 
are not restricted to the unsophisticated. 
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men may have a comparative advantage in self-employment. The association between 
earnings and university/college education, are much stronger for employees than for the self-
employed. This is similar to previous research (see Le, 1999; Parker, 2009). Although some 
previous research has observed parental background effects, there is no particularly 
significant association in these data between self-employment earnings and family 
background in self-employment. Table 1 does find that parents self-employed increases the 
probability of self-employment so this may reflect inheritance rather than comparative 
advantage. Holding a second job reduces earnings significantly for both groups, and in 
quantitative terms particularly for the self-employed. Business start-up tends to be a time-
consuming activity, and although holding a second job will provide some degree of insurance 
against failure it will also reduce earnings capacity. 
 
5. Optimism, Divorce and Smoking 
If the financial optimism measure captures an innate psychological trait, then it should 
be correlated with outcomes beyond the narrowly economic. As a test of validity, results are 
provided for a context involving rather similar issues - the relationship between optimism 
marriage and divorce. Viewed from the perspective of search theory, marriage has something 
in common with entry into self-employment (Shimer and Smith, 2000). The issue is to decide 
when a sufficiently good prospect has arrived. The optimism perspective is captured by the 
adage “marry in haste, repent at leisure”. Optimists may overestimate match quality, 
eventually realise that the marriage is a mistake, and are therefore more likely to divorce.28 
To test this, we compare the optimism - measured as the five-point difference between 
forecast and realization - of those who are currently married and who never divorce within 
the period covered by the dataset (non-divorcees) with those who are currently married but  
																																								 																				
28 Optimists might overrate their own attractiveness and therefore wait longer to get married. Nevertheless, 
matches based on one party overestimating their worth are also likely to be unsatisfactory and therefore more 
likely to terminate. 
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divorce later in the panel (future-divorcees). We also include a series of dummy variables to 
capture the year of divorce, divorced status, year of remarriage (should this occur) and for 
remarried status. The results of this optimism equation are reported in the first column of 
Table A6. Married individuals who will divorce in the future are more optimistic than the 
married who never divorce. It could be argued that the difference is due to unlucky negative 
income shocks triggering divorce rather than intrinsic optimism. To counter this, two further 
equations are estimated. One examines whether these two groups differ in their financial 
forecasts and a parallel equation examines whether they differ in terms of their financial 
realizations. The respective results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table A6. The two-
equation procedure makes it possible to reject the negative shock interpretation. Specifically, 
future-divorcees have significantly higher expectations, so an optimism effect cannot just be 
the result of income collapse. The final element is that future-divorcees have slightly higher 
financial realizations than non-divorcees, but the difference is not statistically significant. So 
it can be concluded that prior intrinsic optimism is associated with divorce.  
As a further validity check, these equations also reveal that smokers have very 
significantly higher financial optimism. Although increased smoking is associated with lower 
financial realizations, at a marginal level of significance, optimism is not just the result of 
low income. Heavy smokers also have significantly higher financial expectations than those 
who do not smoke, given the same observables. Financial optimists tend to assume the worst 
will not happen. This psychology appears to transfer to the consequences of smoking 
suggesting that the optimism measure does at least partially capture a psychological trait.    
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tests whether the equilibrium relationships implied by selection into self-
employment on optimism hold in the earnings data, in particular, that intrinsic optimism leads 
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to mistaken entry into self-employment. Higher intrinsic optimism is therefore associated 
with lower self-employment earnings. Measured optimism is a compound of psychological 
bias and bad luck. In the latter case, optimism in the past implies higher future income. A 
negative relation between self-employment earnings and optimism therefore indicates the 
presence of a selection effect. For those continuing in paid employment, intrinsic optimism 
should not enter the second phase earnings function if past earnings are controlled for. The 
reason is that intrinsic optimism should have similar effects in all periods. This just leaves the 
luck effect, which imparts a positive optimism effect. The difference in the optimism 
coefficients between the two earnings regressions is good evidence that selection on 
optimism influences self-employment earnings.  
The negative correlation between optimism and self-employment earnings could be a 
treatment rather than a selection effect. Optimism may directly affect performance in ways 
that are absent in salaried employment. Perhaps the self-employed have more discretion than 
employees and therefore it is more important that their decisions are based on a realistic 
appraisal of alternatives. An implication of optimism lowering productivity is that realists 
would do best, but self-employment earnings are monotonically decreasing in optimism. 
Even if optimism has a treatment effect, optimists can hardly recognise this, so excessive 
entry is still implied.  
As always, the patterns found could be the result of omitted variable bias. For 
example, apart from optimism, there are no other psychological controls in our earnings 
equation. It is possible that our optimism measure is acting as a proxy for something else. 
Two papers that experimentally examine the correlation between optimism/overconfidence 
and other psychological traits find little connection (Dean and Orteleva, 2016; Stango, 
Yoong, and Zinman, 2016). In principle, there could be some variable other than intrinsic 
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optimism that is correlated with forecast earnings and has opposite effects on second-phase 
paid and self-employment earnings but no candidate comes to mind. 
Recent debate has been critical of entrepreneurship policy, arguing that it can be 
poorly designed and confused with active labour market policy (Shane, 2009). To the extent 
that optimism leads to entry by those whose comparative advantage is not in 
entrepreneurship, this paper complements these concerns.  
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** Appendix ** 
APPENDIX: 
Table A1: First-phase summary statistics by second-phase employment status  
 Futures Nevers 
Variable Mean/ 
Frequency 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean/ 
Frequenc
y 
Std. Dev. 
Financial Forecasting and Earnings: 
  
  
Financial Forecast (t): (3-point scale. 
“Worse off” to “Better off”. -1/0/+1) 
0.324*** 0.633 0.287 0.633 
Financial Realization (t+1): (3-point 
scale. “Worse off” to “Better off”. -
1/0/+1) 
0.155 0.764 0.160 0.757 
Financial Realization (t): (3-point scale. 
“Worse off” to “Better off”. -1/0/+1) 
0.181 0.775 0.182 0.766 
Forecast Error: (5-point scale. Forecast 
(t)  minus Realization (t+1)) 
0.169*** 0.871 0.127 0.849 
     
Gross monthly earnings (in £’s) 1552.79*** 1209.42 1235.09 852.38 
     
Demographics: 
  
  
Age (years) 35.52*** 10.02 34.84 10.53 
Male 0.634*** 
 
0.492  
Marital Status and Household 
Composition:    
  
Single, never married 0.206***  0.229  
Widowed/divorced/ separated 0.055*  0.063  
Married/cohabiting partner employed 0.607  0.611  
Married/cohabiting partner not 
employed  
0.131***  0.097  
Number of dependent children in 
household  
0.707 0.983 0.708 0.968 
  
   
Highest Educational Attainment: 
 
   
University/college degree 0.175***  0.157  
HND/HNC - vocational college 
qualifications 
0.088**  0.076  
A-level 0.268***  0.210  
O-levels/GCSEs 0.315***  0.382  
No qualifications 0.154***  0.175  
Housing Tenure: 
 
   
Outright owner 0.100  0.102  
Own with mortgage 0.736***  0.695  
Private sector rental 0.089  0.092  
Social sector rental 0.075***  0.111  
 Observations 
3138  
(618 individuals) 
28830  
(7367 individuals) 
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Note: Not all variables are recorded for all individuals. Only individuals with at least some 
observations for all variables are included. The difference between the means/frequencies of 
futures and nevers is tested with * indicating significance level below 0.10, ** below 0.05 
and *** below 0.01. Educational attainment is measured through a series of dummy variables 
indicating the highest level of attainment. These are: university or college degree level at 
undergraduate or postgraduate level; HND (Higher National Diplomas) and HNC (Higher 
National Certificates) which are work-related, or vocational, higher education qualifications; 
A-levels or equivalent (post-compulsory examinations taken at 18 as qualifying exams for 
college or university entrance); GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling attainment 
qualifications); and no formal qualifications. 
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Table A2: OLS fixed-effect optimism and realization equations 
Dependent Variable Forecast Error Realization t+1 
Variable Coef. Std. err Coef. Std. err 
Demographics:      
Age  -0.032 0.027 -0.005 0.022 
Age²/100 -0.002 0.015  0.056*** 0.013 
Marital Status and Household 
Composition (Reference: Single, 
never married)     
Widowed/divorced/separated -0.058 0.055  0.055 0.047 
Married/cohabiting-partner 
employed  0.001 0.034  0.010 0.030 
Married/cohabiting-partner not 
employed -0.021 0.042  0.064* 0.037 
Number of dependent children 
in household   0.037*** 0.014  0.009 0.012 
Highest Educational Attainment  
(Reference: No qualifications)     
University/college degree  0.079 0.146  0.036 0.125 
HND/HNC - vocational college 
qualification  -0.027 0.140  0.061 0.117 
A-level -0.091 0.112  0.073 0.101 
O-levels/GCSEs -0.027 0.114  0.058 0.104 
Housing Tenure (Reference: 
Social sector rental)     
Outright owner  0.057 0.054 -0.131*** 0.046 
Own with mortgage  0.088* 0.043 -0.089** 0.037 
Private sector rental  0.093* 0.048 -0.058 0.041 
Financial  Realizations (t) 
(Reference: ‘Worse off’)     
‘Better off’  0.136*** 0.017 -0.117*** 0.014 
‘Same’ -0.001 0.016 -0.065*** 0.013 
Region Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year (survey wave) Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 Observations 31968 
(7985 Individuals)	
31968 
(7985 Individuals)	
F Test 7.07*** 6.28*** 
Note: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year and region of residence 
dummy variables (coefficients not reported). * indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01. 	
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Table A3: OLS fixed-effect log hourly real wage equation  
Dependent Variable Log Hourly Real Wage 
Variable Coef. Std. err 
Demographics: 
 
 
Age  0.071*** 0.008 
Age²/100 -0.104*** 0.005 
Marital Status and Household Composition 
(Reference: Single, never married) 
  
Widowed/divorced/separated  0.046*** 0.017 
Married/cohabiting-partner employed  0.055*** 0.011 
Married/cohabiting-partner not employed  0.069*** 0.013 
Number of dependent children in household  -0.020*** 0.005 
Health (Reference: Health-other)   
Health-excellent  0.000 0.006 
Health-good  0.002 0.005 
Highest Educational Attainment (Reference: No 
qualifications) 
  
University/college degree  0.173*** 0.050 
HND/HNC - vocational college qualification   0.098** 0.047 
A-level  0.071* 0.041 
O-levels/GCSEs -0.008 0.037 
Labour Market Characteristics:   
Union covered, member  0.066*** 0.010 
Union covered, non-member  0.015* 0.008 
Holding a second job -0.022** 0.009 
Job tenure  0.000 0.001 
Job tenure²  0.004 0.005 
Manager / supervisor  0.042*** 0.006 
Promotion opportunities available  0.004 0.005 
Pay includes bonus / profit share  0.031*** 0.005 
Employer provided pension available  0.070*** 0.008 
Pay includes annual rises  0.015*** 0.005 
Shift worker  0.017* 0.010 
Seasonal/Agency Temping/Casual contract -0.023 0.017 
Fixed-term contact -0.009 0.016 
Flexibility in Job Location (Reference: Work at 
employers’ premises) 
  
Work from home  0.129*** 0.048 
Other work location  0.012 0.010 
Work needs travelling  0.022** 0.010 
Occupation (Reference: Other)   
Managers & Administrators  0.116*** 0.017 
Professional   0.132*** 0.018 
Associate Professional & Technical   0.088*** 0.017 
Clerical & Secretarial   0.048*** 0.017 
Craft & Related  0.044** 0.017 
Personal & Protective Service -0.018 0.018 
Sales -0.004 0.019 
Plant & Machine Operatives  0.036** 0.017 
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Employing Sector (Reference: Private Firm)   
Civil Service -0.010 0.020 
Local Government  0.031* 0.017 
Other Public -0.006 0.015 
Non-Profit -0.002 0.024 
One-digit Level Industry (Reference: Agriculture & 
Fishing) 
  
Mining & Quarrying  0.136*** 0.049 
Manufacturing  0.060* 0.031 
Electricity, Gas & Water  0.088* 0.047 
Construction  0.046 0.034 
Wholesale & Retail Trade -0.017 0.032 
Hotels & Restaurants -0.066* 0.034 
Transport, Storage & Communication  0.016 0.034 
Financial Intermediation  0.049 0.036 
Real Estate & Business Activities  0.053* 0.032 
Public Administration & Defence  0.059* 0.032 
Education  0.036 0.036 
Health & Social Work -0.022 0.033 
Social & Personal Services -0.013 0.034 
Private Households & Extra-Territorial Organizations  0.060 0.038 
Firm Size -Number of Co-workers (Reference: Over 
500) 
  
1-9 -0.070*** 0.010 
10-24 -0.048*** 0.010 
25-49 -0.039*** 0.010 
50-99 -0.021** 0.010 
100-199 -0.016* 0.009 
200-499 -0.005 0.007 
Region Controls Yes  
Year (survey wave) Controls Yes  
Observations 36391 
(9718 Individuals) 
F Test 47.87*** 
Note: The regression is clustered by individual and includes year and region of residence 
dummy variables (coefficients not reported). * indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.  
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Table A4: Second-phase summary statistics by employment status. 
	
Self-Employed Employee 
Variable 
Mean/Median/ 
Frequency 
Std. Dev. Mean/Median/   
Frequency 
Std. Dev. 
Gross monthly earnings (in 
£’s): 	 	   
Mean  1381.48***	 2389.04	 1733.92 1241.79 
25th percentile  291.67***	 	  958.75   
50th percentile  833.33***	 	 1499.15   
75th percentile 1583.33***	 	 2208.33  
90th percentile 3031.00	 	 3097.38  
95th percentile 
 
4583.33***	
	
3788.92 
 
Whether Draws up Profit/Loss 
Accounts:  
	 	
  
Draws up accounts 0.823 
	
-  
Does not draw up accounts 0.089 -  
Not yet but will be 0.089 
	
-  
Health:  
	 	
  
Health-excellent 0.267* 
	
0.250  
Health-good 0.496 
	
0.509  
Health-other 0.237 0.241  
Demographics: 
	 	
  
Age (years) 42.48 10.01 42.36 10.58 
Male 0.686***  0.482  
Marital Status and Household 
Composition: 
	
   
Single, never married 0.100***  0.135  
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.060***  0.090  
Married/cohabiting, partner 
employed 0.690***  0.661  
Married/cohabiting, partner 
not employed 0.150***  0.113  
Number of dependent children 
in household 0.824*** 1.063 0.622 0.916 
Highest Educational 
Attainment: 
	 	
  
University/college degree 0.157***  0.181  
HND/HNC - vocational 
college qualification  0.087  0.078  
A-levels 0.261***  0.216  
O-levels/GCSEs 0.314***  0.363  
No qualifications 0.181**  0.163  
Housing Tenure: 
	 	
  
Outright owner 0.183  0.173  
Own with mortgage 0.693  0.678  
Private sector rental 0.075  0.068  
Social sector rental 0.048***  0.081  
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Parental  Background at Age 
14: 
	 	
  
Both parents self-employed 0.034***  0.012  
Father self-employed 0.159***  0.103  
Mother self-employed 0.029**  0.021  
Neither parent self-employed 0.778***  0.864  
Labour Market 
Characteristics:     
Job tenure (years) 3.98*** 4.64 5.68 6.56 
Usual hours worked per week 43.73*** 16.41 34.56 9.59 
Holding a second job 0.095***  0.072  
Observations 1964  
(559 individuals) 
25537 
(6057 individuals) 
Note: The table comprises individuals included in Table A1 with at least some observations 
for all characteristics shown. Differences in the medians/means/frequencies between the self-
employed and employees are tested with * indicating significance level below 0.10, ** below 
0.05 and *** below 0.01. Educational attainment is measured through a series of dummy 
variables indicating the highest level of attainment. These are: university or college degree 
level at undergraduate or postgraduate level; HND (Higher National Diplomas) and HNC 
(Higher National Certificates) which are work-related, or vocational, higher education 
qualifications; A-levels or equivalent (post-compulsory examinations taken at 18 as 
qualifying exams for college or university entrance); GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling 
attainment qualifications); and no formal qualifications. Self-employment earnings are 
computed from a monthly self-employment profit variable for self-employed respondents 
who draw up profit and loss accounts, and a monthly self-employed gross pay variable if a 
self-employed respondent does not draw up profit and loss accounts. Dummy variables are 
shown which indicate whether or not the respondent draws up profit and loss accounts, to 
allow for systematic differences in measurement error between the two response types in the 
earnings model. Specifically, respondents are asked: “In the business are annual business 
accounts prepared for the Inland Revenue for tax purposes?”, with the possible responses 
being “Yes”, “No” and “Not yet but will be.” 
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Table A5: Estimation of optimism on gross monthly self-employed and employee 
earnings 
Dependent Variable Gross Monthly Earnings (in £’s) 
Estimator (1) Tobit (2) OLS (3) Tobit 
Sample Self-Employed Employee Pooled 
Variable 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Standardized Optimism (��) -282.50** 48.10** -239.37*** 
 (143.40) (22.56) (88.67) 
Employee   743.80*** 
   (80.82) 
Employee*Optimism   277.20*** 
   (89.03) 
Draws up accounts -26.23   
 (164.57)   
Not yet but will be 416.20**   
 (204.55)   
Past Earnings	(������������<) 980.60*** 1550*** 1467*** 
 (351.76) (64.99) (67.16) 
Past Realizations	(����������������<) 90.36 146.8*** 137.0*** 
 (173.40) (31.77) (34.95) 
Health-excellent 56.31 76.68*** 70.53*** 
 (183.55) (23.48) (25.76) 
Health-good 58.55 25.78* 26.61 
 (114.25) (15.10) (16.42) 
Age 85.28 115.6*** 112.1*** 
 (64.28) (14.66) (13.75) 
Age² -1.276* -1.521*** -1.479*** 
 (0.71) (0.11) (0.12) 
Male 375.0** 144.0*** 198.3*** 
 (177.89) (24.28) (25.09) 
Widowed/divorced/separated -572.30* 96.29** 68.24 
 (335.58) (44.04) (46.28) 
Married/cohabiting-partner employed -104.50 74.54*** 52.85 
 (305.48) (28.25) (32.36) 
Married/cohabiting-partner not 
employed 
-16.76 233.6*** 209.5*** 
 (336.25) (48.06) (51.42) 
Number of dependent children in 
household 
-97.84 -12.96 -17.29 
 (95.23) (12.92) (15.43) 
University/college degree -134.30 617.5*** 600.6*** 
 (355.48) (83.97) (85.28) 
HND/HNC - vocational college 
qualification 
-92.88 245.2*** 245.9*** 
 (290.42) (85.55) (86.33) 
A-Level -464.1* 93.20 71.41 
 (251.98) (67.85) (68.79) 
O-levels/GCSEs -211.4 -80.16 -80.67 
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 (235.49) (60.63) (63.03) 
Outright owner 298.2 -6.427 8.619 
 (284.37) (32.97) (36.68) 
Own with mortgage 127.1 7.972 29.56 
 (229.28) (24.59) (25.83) 
Private sector rental -185.0 -71.74** -68.34* 
 (262.70) (36.72) (36.39) 
Both parents self-employed 14.30 -25.62 60.34 
 (421.86) (122.44) (121.01) 
Father self-employed 55.81 22.33 22.01 
 (198.57) (41.85) (49.19) 
Mother self-employed -593.1* 32.18 -26.05 
 (398.80) (88.81) (83.03) 
Usual hours worked per week 9.638** 37.64*** 32.27*** 
 (4.36) (1.13) (1.25) 
Job tenure 42.03** -0.788 -0.0849 
 (18.03) (1.33) (1.43) 
Holds a second job -315.3** -89.83*** -124.4*** 
 (136.15) (27.76) (28.10) 
One-digit Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year (survey wave) Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,964 25,537 27,501 
Wald Chi² 644.57*** 15886.52*** 19981.08*** 
R²  0.5953  
Note: The estimated standard errors in parenthesis are clustered and bootstrapped to account 
for the panel nature of the data and the fact that �<, 	������������< and 	����������������< are 
generated, rather than observed.  A bootstrap procedure is used involving 500 repetitions 
which draws bootstrap samples from the clusters (random samples with replacement) and 
puts them through the multiple stage-procedure. * indicates significance level (p-value) 
below 0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01. Columns (1) and (3) have 137 left censored 
observations at gross monthly earnings ≤ 0. From column (3) the effect of optimism on 
earnings for employees is £37.84, which is statistically significant at approximately the 10% 
level.  
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Table A6: Ordered probit regression for forecast error, expectations and realizations  
Dependent Variable Forecast Error  Expectation t Realization t+1 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Coef. Std. 
err  
Coef. Std. 
err  
Coef. Std. err  
Divorce Status (Reference: 
Non-divorcees)       
Future Divorcee  0.103*** 0.033  0.158*** 0.050  0.001 0.038 
Year of divorce  0.141 0.155 -0.192 0.148 -0.341** 0.166 
Divorced  0.087*** 0.025  0.099*** 0.037 -0.026 0.027 
Year of Remarriage -0.056 0.130  0.298* 0.157  0.325** 0.156 
Re-Married  0.063 0.051  0.062 0.054 -0.031 0.047 
Smoker (Number of 
Cigarettes)  0.005*** 0.001  0.006*** 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 
Demographics:        
Age  -0.007 0.006 -0.042*** 0.007 -0.028*** 0.006 
Age²/100  0.000 0.000  0.000*** 0.000  0.000*** 0.000 
Male  0.034** 0.013  0.040** 0.018 -0.009 0.014 
Employment Status 
(Reference: Employee)       
Self-Employed  0.126*** 0.022  0.207*** 0.031  0.012 0.023 
Household Composition        
Number of dependent 
children in household   0.022*** 0.007  0.011 0.009 -0.019*** 0.007 
Highest Educational 
Attainment  (Reference: No 
qualifications)       
University/college degree 
-
0.125*** 0.023 -0.040 0.032  0.120*** 0.025 
HND/HNC - vocational 
college qualification  -0.043 0.028  0.044 0.039  0.085*** 0.030 
A-level -0.018 0.020 -0.008 0.029  0.012 0.022 
O-levels/GCSEs  0.001 0.018  0.018 0.025  0.011 0.019 
Housing Tenure (Reference: 
Social sector rental)       
Outright owner 
-
0.086*** 0.029 -0.207*** 0.038 -0.058** 0.030 
Own with mortgage -0.035 0.025 -0.052 0.032  0.001 0.026 
Private sector rental -0.015 0.037 -0.018 0.048  0.004 0.039 
Financial  Realizations (t) 
(Reference: ‘Worse off’)       
‘Better off’ 
-
0.337*** 0.017  0.464*** 0.023  0.790*** 0.020 
‘Same’ 
-
0.301*** 0.015 -0.009 0.020  0.365*** 0.017 
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year (survey wave) Controls Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 41289 (5676 Individuals) 
Log Likelihood -48832.9 -35064.0 -41274.2 
chi²   1099.4*** 1937.5*** 2823.8*** 
Pseudo R² 0.014 0.044 0.046 
 
Note: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year and region of residence 
dummy variables (coefficients not reported). * indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.   
	
